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Love, Laughter, and the
Harmony of Opposites
in Plato’s Symposium

Nicholas Rockower,
Bucknell University
The interpretations of Plato’s Symposium are as varied and
contradictory as the very encomia they address. The disparate
parts of the text may be viewed as sophisticated philosophy,
laughable pedantry, tragicomedy or beautiful sophistry. As a
whole, it can be equally opaque and intimidating. This essay does
not presume to suggest some transcendental means of interpreting
the work; indeed, to suppose that such a method exists is to ignore
its complex, multi-faceted nature. Rather, the specific and
recurring theme of the harmony of opposites throughout Plato’s
Symposium will be elucidated with reference to the use of humor
and dialogue.
From the very beginning, Plato’s Symposium contains
complicated trends and permutations within the dialogue. The
first difficulty a reader faces is apparent within the opening lines:
the speaker, Apollodorus, is responding to a question which is not
contained within the text. Moreover, the questioners are
composed of unnamed persons1 who remain anonymous
throughout the entirety of the dialogue. The first difficulty is
easily overcome as Apollodorus recalls a recent incident in which
he answered the exact same question (172a4-b8); this development,
while elucidating the original question, introduces a second level
of narration.2 The use of multiple narrative levels is not limited to
the beginning of the work; indeed, it is a prevalent and important
theme throughout. In this instance, the second narrative level is
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employed only briefly, but serves a threefold purpose.
Firstly, the dialogue within this narrative sets a humorous
tone: Apollodorus recounts being hailed by Glaucon in a teasing
manner (καὶ παίζων ἅµα τῇ κλήσει [and jesting as he called];
172a4).3 Here, the first distinctive thread of γέλως [laughter] is
established and remains a theme which runs throughout the
entirety of the work. Secondly, the nature of the question is (as
stated above) clarified: both Glaucon and (presumably) the
unnamed audience within the primary narrative level are
interested in οἱ ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι [the speeches of love] of Agathon,
Socrates and Alcibiades (as well as those of ‘the others who were
there’) (172b1-b4). Thirdly and finally, it clearly indicates that the
symposium at which these λόγοι occurred has subsequently
entered the realm of legend: Glaucon mentions that he has heard
the story before; “ἄλλος γάρ τίς µοι διηγεῖτο ἀκηοὼς Φοίνικος
τοῦ Φιλίππου [for some other described it to me, having heard it
from Phoinikos, son of Philippos]” (172b4-b5). Furthermore, he is
confused about the date at which this symposium took place,
mistakenly believing that it was a fairly recent occurrence.
Glaucon is startled to hear that it occurred a long time ago –
Apollodorus himself only knows details because he heard the
story from Aristodemus (who was present at the symposium)
(172c1-173a7). The symposium is still clearly generating a great
deal of interest, despite the temporal gap. Thus, the tale is
portrayed as a legend; in a sense, it has escaped the bonds of time.
With the termination of this second narrative level, a brief
dialogue between Apollodorus and his questioner[s] commences
(173c1-174a1). Notably, the theme of gentle jibing and general
humor already established by the exchange between Apollodorus
and Glaucon appears yet again in lines 173d6-d10; the trope is
crossing narrative levels. When the tale finally begins (l74a2), it
occurs within a third narrative level: Within the primary level,
Apollodorus is telling a story to the unnamed questioners; within
the second narrative level, Aristodemus tells the tale of the
symposium. Thus, all the action occurs within this third narrative
level, passed to the extradiegetic audience through multiple
narrative levels.4 The reader is repeatedly reminded of this fact
throughout the remainder of the work via the near-constant use of
indirect speech.5 Unlike the start of the work, the account does not
begin mid-way through a conversation: indeed, the story begins
outside and preliminary to the realm of the symposium. Lines
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174a2-a4 depict Socrates as unusually well-dressed and clean, to
Aristodemus’ subsequent surprise: he asks where Socrates is going
“καλὸς γεγενηµένος [having made himself beautiful]”. Socrates
explains that he is headed towards Agathon’s δεῖπνον [feast]; he
adds that he ἐκαλλωπισάµην [embellished himself] in order to be
as beautiful as Agathon (174a2-a8). There is most certainly a
comedic note within this exchange, for Socrates is notoriously
ugly, just as Agathon is notoriously beautiful. Moreover, the idea
that Socrates would consider himself ‘beautified’ by such
superficial means is absolutely ridiculous: the Socratic notion of
‘beauty’ is antithetical to this suggestion.
Thus far, one must wonder why this λόγος as
(purportedly) earned such interest; it seems as though it will be
nothing but a comedic account of a gathering of drinking
companions. The first signal that these expectations are erroneous
appears simultaneously with the entrance into the symposium: as
Aristodemus is hailed by Agathon, both Aristodemus and the
reader become aware that Socrates has, at some point, wandered
off. Socrates is discovered standing, oblivious to the world around
him, on the neighbors’ porch (174d5-175a9). This, of course,
continues the theme of comedy: Aristodemus himself admits that
he is experiencing something amusing (if slightly awkward): καί τι
ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν [and he said that he then suffered
something comic]. However, it is nonetheless incongruous:
Socrates’ earlier description emphasized his desire to appear well
before Agathon; now he stands, seemingly absorbed entirely
within himself, without a care for what others might think.
Agathon’s response to a description of his guest’s behavior is,
naturally, one of surprise: “ἄτοπόν γ’ ἔφη [‘very strange,’ he
said]”(175a10). Socrates’ behavior is both ἄτοπος [strange,
unusual] with respect to Agathon’s view8 and, in addition, to the
sympotic tradition. One of the primary purposes of the traditional
symposium is to fashion a world which binds together the
participants, removing social boundaries and subduing
consciousness of the outside world.9 By standing outside, refusing
to communicate, Socrates is acting in a way antithetical to the
traditions of the sympotic culture—or perhaps, as though he is
enjoying his own, entirely internal ‘symposium.’
Though this event is without a doubt comedic, it
incorporates an odd contrast. It startles the host, Agathon, who is
only pacified by Aristodemus’ assurances that the behavior is
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‘normal.’ Agathon’s discomfort with the situation is clearly
indicated by his continuing attempts to send for Socrates; only by
the intervention of Aristodemus does Socrates’ ‘vigil’ remain
undisturbed. By remaining outside, Socrates has created a
situation which is both γελοῖος [humorous] and ἄτοπος
[unusual]. This combination of incongruous concepts is a trend
that will play an important theme throughout the remainder of the
symposium: contrasts abound throughout the entirety of the text.
Even as Socrates first reclines beside Agathon, a brief jesting
dialogue ensues, drawing a contrast between their individual
forms of σοφία [wisdom] (175d1-e10). In fact, it is apparent that
this particular symposium itself is incongruous: although a
‘symposium’ is literally a ‘drinking together,’ the participants of
this symposium decide that they will in fact moderate their
drinking.
The proposition is delivered by Eryximachus, a doctor who
is portrayed in a strongly pedantic manner, after he hears several
complaints concerning the heavy drinking of the night before (at a
certain point Aristophanes states that he was ‘baptized’ in wine)
(176b3-b5). After giving a bombastic medical warning against an
excess of alcohol, Eryximachus brings about a democratic
agreement to have a more leisurely symposium. This is unusual
not only in reference to the etymological connotations of the word
‘symposium’: the ritual presented the opportunity, for those
participants who had a more philosophic goal in mind than mere
drunken παιδιά [play], to experience the ‘euphoria-dysphoria
opposition,’ which Pellizer defines as “the half-way between
sobriety and drunkenness, so that all could enjoy liberty and ease
of speech, gaiety and release from cares, without falling into the
unregulated, violent excesses practiced by barbarians, but also
without the sterile gravity of the sober and non-drinkers” (Pellizer
1990, 179).10 In other words, this specific sympotic tradition could
be described as the interweaving, with reference to humor, of
σπουδή [seriousness] and γέλως [laughter]. It seems as though
this symposium will not fall into the euphoria-dysphoria
framework; σωφροσύνη [moderation] will be the keyword of this
gathering.
Eryximachus’ next proposition, however, has the full
support of traditional sympotic behavior. He proposes that each
participant, in turn, deliver a eulogy in praise of Ἔρως.11 The
practice of dialogue being passed along by the members of a
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symposium is a well-established ritual. Moreover, the subject of
ἔρως is an extremely popular among the established sympotic
topics (Pellizer 1990, 180). The first encomium is given by
Phaedrus (as Eryximachus indicates that he originally conceived
the idea). Phaedrus’ encomium is perfectly suited for a
symposium, if lacking slightly in independent thought. He quotes
the archaic poets and draws upon several mythological stories;
recitations of this type are common within symposia. He presents
Ἔρως as the oldest of gods, a force leading mortals away from
αἰσχύνη [dishonor] and towards ἀρετή [virtue], for “no-one likes
to appear cowardly before his beloved.”12 He unfortunately makes
no attempt to define what belongs within the realm of ἀρετή/
[virtue], nor within the realm of αἰσχύνη [dishonor]. His rhetoric
seems to operate on the assumption that there exists an unspoken
but perfectly definitive means to distinguish between these
concepts (Hunter 2004, 42). As any reader familiar with Socrates’
method of interrogation knows, these are rhetorically suicidal
errors. Although Phaedrus’ encomium is one of the least notable
(he is significantly not included within Glaucon’s list of those
present), it is now clear why this symposium has acquired its
mythic status; the members of the symposium are persons of
note—some with famed poetic or rhetorical abilities—each about
to deliver a speech on a pervasively intriguing topic.
Aristodemus’ account continues, bypassing “ἄλλοι τινές
[some others]” who are, apparently, worthy of remembrance with
reference to neither their names nor their ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι [erotic
speeches]. He then proceeds to narrate Pausanias’ speech.
Pausanias opens with the rhetorical trope of finding some fault
within the previous speech: he claims that it is incorrect to speak of
Ἔρως as one being a single deity, for “δὴ δύο ἐστόν [in fact, there
are two]” (180d5). Pausanias elucidates that, just as there is a
Common (Πάνδηµος) Aphrodite and a Heavenly (Οὐρανία)
Aphrodite, so also is there a Common and a Heavenly Ἔρως. He
further incorporates concepts of gender within his encomium:
unlike Common Aphrodite, Heavenly Aphrodite is ἀµήτωρ
[motherless], as she is born from the sea foaming about the
dismembered ‘parts’ of Οὐρανός. This contrast plays an
important role within Pausanias’ speech, which is given over
mainly to praise of the pederastic relationship between an ἐραστής
[lover] and his ἐρώµενος [beloved] (181c4-185c4). This topic again
is appropriate within the symposium, for many of the sympotic
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poems are composed on the subject of pederastic relationships.13
Furthermore, Pausanias’ clearly elitist distinction between
Common Aphrodite and Heavenly Aphrodite indicates a
hierarchical mindset: another potential facet of the symposium was
a means for the elite to distinguish themselves from the lower
classes.14
Although the dialogue is progressing in a clearly sympotic
manner, the humor of the situation seems to have vanished
entirely as the various jests and Socrates’ comic behavior have
given way to epic recitations on the nature of Ἔρως. After
Pausanias, however, comes a brief interaction between
Eryximachus and Aristophanes. The comic poet has suddenly
succumbed to a fit of hiccoughs, giving the doctor both a chance to
grant his medical advice and deliver his encomium ahead of
schedule. Aristophanes’ ailment is the first discordant note since
the start of the encomia. He destabilizes the pattern, causing a
brief dialogue and re-arranging the natural order of speeches. This
event signals a change in tone as Eryximachus, in full medical
glory, begins his eulogy.15 Rather than using stories of heroes or
gods to advance his argument, Eryximachus employs his own
medical knowledge. His encomium expands the domain of Ἔρως
to include ‘everything which exists.’ Although such a discourse
may not seem as appropriate for the sympotic tradition as the
encomia of Pausanias or Phaedrus, Eryximachus nonetheless
manages to include an extremely relevant trope: he speaks on the
harmony of opposites, arguing against an imbalance toward any
extreme. His speech is overly technical and, in the end, as much
an encomium of medicine as of Ἔρως (Hunter 2004, 56).
Nonetheless, it is startling to note how his eulogy embodies a
specific sympotic theme, to a greater extent than either of the
previous encomia: just as Phaedrus is concerned with the concepts
of αἰσχύνη [dishonor] and ἀρετή [virtue], and Pausanias with the
two contrasting types of Ἔρως, Eryximachus also speaks of polar
opposites. However, unlike either of his predecessors,
Eryximachus is concerned with establishing a balance between any
two extremes (186b4-188e3). This perfectly echoes the sympotic
concern of finding the perfect harmony between drunkenness and
sobriety, violent excess and sober gravity, and, significantly,
γέλως [laughter] and σπουδή [seriousness]. The suggestion that
Eryximachus is an embodiment of the sympotic trope is, of course,
absolutely absurd. His character is portrayed clearly as

32

ROCKOWER, Love, Laughter, and the Harmony of Opposites

excessively pedantic and sober. It may be said, perhaps, that
Eryximachus obeys the Delphic precept of µηδὲν ἄγαν [nothing to
excess] to an excessive extent: he employs σωφροσύνη
[moderation] extravagantly. Nevertheless, he acts as a catalyst for
sympotic themes: his pedantic nature is unwittingly amusing and
brought about the correct atmosphere for the ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι to
occur.
Eryximachus is followed by Aristophanes, who has
managed to both cure his hiccoughs and make a jest: he announces
his recovery while simultaneously mocking Eryximachus’ speech.
His humorous tone is not surprising; he is a comic poet, a fact
which no doubt influences Eryximachus to warn him, in response,
not to indulge in humor within the upcoming encomium.
Aristophanes corrects him, indicating that what must be avoided is
not humour (as laughter is his specialty), but rather he must avoid
saying καταγέλαστα [ridiculous things]. Implicit within this
statement is again the idea of avoidance of extremes; furthermore,
there is a possible undertone that Eryximachus did not avoid this
excess: Eryximachus rightly spoke from his area of expertise, but
was in deliverance and tone immoderate. Aristophanes, as one
would expect from a comic poet, does not end his jests here: in
fact, his entire encomium may be perceived as a joke at
Eryximachus’ expense. He describes the original form of
ἄνθρωποι [humanity] as two humans conjoined, with three
potential genders (male-male, male-female, female-female). Due
to the excess of power inherent in this form, the gods found it
necessary to weaken the race: Zeus split everyone down the
middle, resulting in the current human form, with the threat that
he will do it again if they continue to behave outrageously.
Aristophanes attributes the birth of Ἔρως to this act: each half
yearned to be re-united with its other half (189d7-193d6). This
speech clearly has comedic aspects. It mocks Eryximachus in that
it asserts a biological truth; a truth which is, of course, patently
fatuous. It does not require any specialized knowledge to interpret
– one method of reading Aristophanes’ speech is as characteristic
‘of unsophisticated, subliterate folklore’ (Dover 1966, 45).
Moreover, it contains a multitude of logical flaws. The story itself
is remarkably different from any extant Aristophanic text;16 its
comedic traits are balanced by a tragic subtext. Robert Wardy
sums up the contrast neatly with his statement: “What is so very
poignant in this fiction is the collocation of defective human flesh
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with divine machinery…. Human nature, without the intervention
of divine artifice, is doomed to perpetual erotic frustration:
comedy or tragedy?” (Wardy 2002, 21)17 Ultimately, Aristophanes’
encomium contains the same message inherent in Eryximachus’
eulogy. Both advise embracing σωφροσύνη [moderation]:
Eryximachus, due to ‘scientific’ reasons; Aristophanes, due to the
threat that we may again be split and doomed to wander forever
on one leg. Thus, Aristophanes’ encomium may be viewed as a
humorous, yet tragic mirror—a σπουδαιογέλοιον [seriocomic]
inversion—of Eryximachus’ speech.
It is worth noting that, at some point, Aristodemus himself
was passed over. He shares a couch with Eryximachus and
Aristophanes, yet the order of speeches oversteps him without any
objection. It should not be assumed that this is some rhetorical
trope to make the reader feel present within the symposium; the
persistent use of indirect speech is a consistent reminder that
everything is delivered via a narrator. Instead, it serves to place
Aristodemus outside the symposium: he is granted a bird’s-eye
view of the scenario, an untainted image that is now passed on to
the reader. One might expect, perceiving the sympotic trend
developing thus far, that the subsequent eulogy (delivered by
Agathon) will offer further and even more complex tropes.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that he is the tragedian following the
comic poet, he concerns himself not at all with the harmony of
contrasts. Instead, he gives a beautifully rendered, but nonetheless
empty, speech in praise of Ἔρως—in Hunter’s words, “a beautiful
sound signifying nothing” (Hunter 2004, 73).
In essence, Agathon’s speech functions as a springboard for
the following speech of Socrates. There is again a dialogue
between the end of Agathon’s speech and the start of Socrates’
(198a1-201c9): Eveually, Socrates leads Agathon to admit that
every assertion within his encomium was utterly mistaken.
Socrates then gives his eulogy in the form of a story, repeating a
conversation between himself and his (purported) former teacher,
Diotima. This exchange creates yet another narrative level atop
the already exorbitant construction. Within this narrative level,
the dialogue echoes what just took place between Agathon and
Socrates; however, in this instance, it is Socrates who is being
cross-examined. More importantly, his interrogator is woman.
Socrates has gained rhetorical dominance in the midst of a
patriarchal ritual, only to attribute that dominance to the wisdom
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he gained from a female. Thus, the contradictions inherent within
the premises of Socrates’ encomium fit the sympotic theme; as
before, however, Socrates’ actions are ἄτοπος [unusual]. His
encomium is nonetheless amusing, as he portrays himself as a
naïve student, blindly falling for Diotima’s every rhetorical trick.18
Within Diotima’s speech, Ἔρως is established as the child
of Πενία [Lack] and Πόρος [Way, Resource]. He is neither
beautiful nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly, neither wise nor
ignorant—but rather somewhere between these extremes.
Furthermore, he is not a god, but a “δαίµων µέγας… µεταξύ ἐστι
θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ [a great power… (which) is between god and
mortal]”(202d13-e1), acting as a mediator between mortals and
gods. It seems that Diotima is portraying Ἔρως as the
embodiment of the sympotic middle. From this point, however,
the narrative breaks the recurring trend: Diotima’s description of
the path towards beauty builds slowly toward an ideal,
culminating when suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), one catches sight of “το
θεῖον καλόν… µὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ
χρωµάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς [the sacred
beauty… not full of human flesh and skin and much other mortal
nonsense]” (211e1-212).19 The sheer number of narrators at this
point creates a dizzying effect for the reader: the words of Diotima
come echoing out of an abyss, blurring the lines between narrative
levels. The extradiegetic audience blends with the diegetic, with
Apollodorus, and even Aristodemus; just as a symposiast sees
himself reflected in a sympotic mixing-bowl, so too is the modern
reader reflected through this mise en abîme. Plato’s Symposium is, in
a way, a literary mixing-bowl, its sides decorated with beautiful
renditions of sympotic themes while Diotima’s words echo up
from the Gorgon-headed centre. And, just as the Gorgon-head
reminds the symposiasts of the outside world, so too do Diotima’s
words break the sympotic circle.
All the audiences are drawn back in, however, as suddenly
(ἐξαίφνης) the famed drunken Alcibiades staggers in, his κῶµος
[band of revelers] invading the symposium. Alcibiades’ entrance
is extremely comic,20 functioning to break the ‘spell’ of Socrates’
words.21 His subsequent encomium of Socrates draws the
audiences full back into the realm of the symposium—a
symposium which now no longer may be categorized by its
σωφροσύνη [moderation]. Moreover, his eulogy makes full use of
the sympotic middle; it is thoroughly σπουδαιογέλοιον
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[seriocomic], insulting and praising Socrates in one. Ultimately,
his speech portrays the philosopher in a manner equivalent to
Diotima’s previous depiction of Ἔρως, suggesting that Socrates
strives to exemplify the pathway to ideal beauty.22 The
symposium is denigrated to drunken revel, ending the next
morning with Socrates explaining to Agathon and Aristophanes
that a tragedian is also a comic poet, and vice-versa (212c4-223d7).
In the article “Plato on the Psychology of Humor,” Shelley
asserts that “Plato viewed humor as the recognition by the intellect
of what modern scholars would call incongruity—the special
juxtaposition of incoherent concepts” (353). Shelley goes on to
state that, in an ideal world, humor would not exist; however,
given the present state of affairs, humor is a useful tool to balance
“excessive seriousness,” (361): “Plato implies that laughter is good
at least insofar as it restores the soul to a healthy condition by
balancing out the ill feeling of malice” (354). Although Shelley’s
article does not address the Symposium directly, its assertions are
nonetheless clearly applicable. The work portrays a sympotic
setting, revealing the efficacy of the unification of opposites. Thus,
accepting Shelley’s interpretation of the Platonic view of humor,
the symposium and its ideals on moderation may be seen as
placed, hierarchically, immediately below the Socratic ideal; as the
Socratic ideal has not yet been attained, the symposiasts content
themselves with the lesser superlative of the sympotic ideal.
However, in this instance, the trinity of Ἔρως, the philosophical
sympotic setting, and Socrates work in harmony to build the
symposium to a transcendental vision: a flagrant contrast from
moderation into idealized excess startles the audiences,
functioning to elevate them from the sympotic into the Socratic.
Thus Plato, acting behind the narrative levels as an authorative
sympotic δαίµων, utilizes the attributes of the symposium to
create a realm in which, for a brief moment, the spectators may
perceive “τὸ θεῖον καλόν [the sacred beauty].”
ENDNOTES
1. Inferred by the use of πυνθάνεσθαι in second person plural. Cf.
Plato, Symposium, ed. C. J. Rowe, (Oxford: Oxbow Books), 1998, 127
n.172a1; R. G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge: W. Heffer and
Sons), 1909.
2. The dialogue between Apollodorus and the unnamed persons
comprises the primary narrative level, with Plato as the narrator. Plato
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exists outside the text: in narratological terminology, Plato narrates from
the ‘extradiegetic level’; cf. Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology
(Aldershot: Scolar) 1988.
3. The exact nature of Glaucon’s joke is not understood; cf. Rowe, 128 n.
172a3-4.
4. The logical question of authenticity is answered by 173b5-b6.
5. There are many instances where direct speech is used; they occur,
however, within a narrative that is nearly always indirect.
6. Cf. Rowe, 131 n. 174a4.
7. Richard Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (New York: Oxford University
Press) 2004, 71.
8. Rowe summarizes this with the slightly whimsical phrase “what
[Socrates] is doing is not what people like Agathon go in for” (132 n. a10).
9. Cf. Walter Donlan, “Pistos Philos Hetairos” in: Theognis of Megara, ed.
Gregory Nagy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
10. Stephen Halliwell, “The Uses of Laughter in Greek Culture,” The
Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1991), 290: “The occasions
within Greek culture which possess such a framework of convention are
paradigmatically those of conviviality and festivity…. These contexts
have in common a distance or detachment from normal, everyday affairs,
and, in certain areas, a suspension of usual standards of behaviour.”
11. Ezio Pellizer, “Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment”
in: Oswyn Murray, Sympotica (Oxford : Clarendon, 1990), 179: “…in the
symposion are developed the rules of an elaborate system of
communication…” i.e. the ‘logos sympotikos.’
12. “τὴν ἐπὶ µὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιµίαν
[the shame for shameful things, and ambition for beautiful things]”
(178d2-d3).
13. Cf. Theognidea 237-54.
14. Lesley Kurke, Coins Bodies, and Gold: The Politics of Meaning in Archaic
Greece (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 19.
15. For an argument against the perception of Eryximachus as a pedant,
see Ludwig Edelstein, “The Role of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium,”
in Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol.
76, (1945), 85-103.
16. Cf. A. M. Bowie,”Thinking with Drinking: Wine and the Symposium
in Aristophanes,” in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 117, (1997), 1-21.
17. Cf. Harry Neumann, ‘On the Comedy of Plato’s Aristophanes’ in The
American Journal of Philology, Vol. 87, No. 4 (1966), 420-426.
18. Cf. Hunter, 82; Rowe, 173 n. 201d1-204c8.
19. Alexander Nehamas, “Only in the Contemplation of Beauty is Human
Life Worth Living: Plato, Symposium 211d” in European Journal of
Philosophy, 15,(2007), 3: “The Form of Beauty, then, may be more beautiful
than everything else and the intensity of the true philosopher’s love may
dwarf our everyday feelings….” This functions as one of the few
extremes found within the Symposium which is not accompanied by its
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polar opposite.
20. Frisbee C. C. Sheffield, “Alcibiades’ Speech: A Satyric Drama” in
Greece & Rome, 48, (2001), 200-201: “Alcibiades introduces this section of
his speech as a parody of the mysteries of philosophy.”
21. Hunter, 101: “Socrates is… a Marsyas… whose music is used in ritual
initiations for its qualities of manic possession.”
22. Sheffield, 194: “Many scholars have argued that the speech is
designed to show Socrates as the embodiment of the erotic theory
outlined in his own speech….”
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